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The Resource Above politics : bureaucratic discretion and credible commitment, Gary J. Miller, Washington University in St. Louis; Andrew B. Whitford, University of Georgia

Above politics : bureaucratic discretion and credible commitment, Gary J. Miller, Washington University in St. Louis; Andrew B. Whitford, University of Georgia

Label
Above politics : bureaucratic discretion and credible commitment
Title
Above politics
Title remainder
bureaucratic discretion and credible commitment
Statement of responsibility
Gary J. Miller, Washington University in St. Louis; Andrew B. Whitford, University of Georgia
Creator
Contributor
Author
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
  • "Economic development requires secure contract enforcement and stable property rights. Normal majority-rule politics, such as bargaining over distributive and monetary policies, generate instability and frequently undermine economic development. Above Politics argues that bureaucracies can contribute to stability and economic development, but only if they are insulated from unstable politics. A separation-of-powers stalemate creates the conditions for bureaucratic autonomy. But what keeps delegated bureaucrats from being more abusive as they become more autonomous? One answer is the negotiation of long-term, cooperative relationships - that (when successful) typically bind subordinates to provide more effort in exchange for autonomy. Even more compelling is professionalism, which embeds its professional practitioners in professional norms and culture, and incidentally mitigates corruption. Financial examples are provided throughout the book, which ends with an analysis of the role played by professionalized bureaucracies during the Great Recession"--
  • "Above Politics argues that bureaucracies can contribute to stability and economic development, but only if they are insulated from unstable politics. A separation-of-powers stalemate creates the conditions for bureaucratic autonomy. But what keeps delegated bureaucrats from being more abusive as they become more autonomous? One answer is the negotiation of long-term, cooperative relationships - that (when successful) typically bind subordinates to provide more effort in exchange for autonomy"--
Member of
Assigning source
  • Provided by publisher
  • Provided by publisher
Cataloging source
DLC
Dewey number
352.20973
Index
index present
LC call number
JK421
LC item number
.M458 2016
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
bibliography
Series statement
Political economy of institutions and decisions
Label
Above politics : bureaucratic discretion and credible commitment, Gary J. Miller, Washington University in St. Louis; Andrew B. Whitford, University of Georgia
Instantiates
Publication
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 239-260) and index
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
The moral hazard of bureaucrats and politicians -- Political moral hazard and credible commitment -- Political moral hazard and bureaucratic autonomy -- 'Above politics': the separation of powers and bureaucratic autonomy -- The control paradox, trust, and leadership -- Professionalism and credible commitment -- The politicization of financial regulation -- The financial crisis and reregulation
Dimensions
23 cm.
Extent
xii, 271 pages
Isbn
9781107008755
Isbn Type
(hardback)
Lccn
2015039155
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
n
System control number
(OCoLC)929331795
Label
Above politics : bureaucratic discretion and credible commitment, Gary J. Miller, Washington University in St. Louis; Andrew B. Whitford, University of Georgia
Publication
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 239-260) and index
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
The moral hazard of bureaucrats and politicians -- Political moral hazard and credible commitment -- Political moral hazard and bureaucratic autonomy -- 'Above politics': the separation of powers and bureaucratic autonomy -- The control paradox, trust, and leadership -- Professionalism and credible commitment -- The politicization of financial regulation -- The financial crisis and reregulation
Dimensions
23 cm.
Extent
xii, 271 pages
Isbn
9781107008755
Isbn Type
(hardback)
Lccn
2015039155
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
n
System control number
(OCoLC)929331795

Library Locations

    • Harold B. Lee Library Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, 84602, US
      40.249156 -111.649242
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